Sheldon has been on many tokenomic advisory engagements in the past 10 years but his primary focus is solution engineering not economics and game theorem. Therefore, Sheldon will frequently partner with EatSleepCrypto on tokenomic engagements including but not limited to research, RFCs, chaos engineering and solution validation. Engagements have the option of being technology focused, nontechnical, or hybrid in focuses of econmomic security. ESC has provided demand-side tokenomic theory in it's engagements with multiple digital asset issuers with references and real world examples to supporting theory, making them a perfect contrast to solution engineering in multiple tech stacks. 

 

A token economics system is designed to incentivize positive behaviors and disincentivize negative behaviors within a digital asset or cryptocurrency network. In the context of research, development, academic references, and solution engineering for new digital asset economies, a well-designed token economics system can play a crucial role in motivating stakeholders to contribute to the network in positive ways.

 

Incentives can take many forms within a token economics system. Initiators of a digital asset economy may contribute to the network in exchange for building and mainting equitable systems or improving the codebases that support others. Researchers must be incentivized to conduct studies and publish papers by receiving tokens as a reward for their contributions, simultaneously there must be operational disincetives to prevent abuse. Solution engineers should be encouraged to validate the underlying digital asset and accompanying systems, but should not be expected to work on such engagements without payments of an asset outside the immediate risk of that system.

 

Disincentives must be built into a token economics system to counter balance abuses of incentives, but also to maintain an equilibrium of concentrated power & motivations as a system grows - the easiest example to research is Bitcoin mining difficulty. Security controls should eventually impact markets to the point of dilluting value in attack vectors such that the cost of attack is significantly greater than the feasibly extracted value. By making abusive behaviors costly or impossible platforms are made more secure and resistant to manipulation.